主讲人Speaker: 刘冲  教授   北京大学

时间Date & Time: 2026年11月6日（周五），10:00--11:30

地点Venue:粤海校区汇星楼565会议室

内容简介/ Abstract:

Employment may fail to prevent reoffending when earnings arrive too late. Linking individual court records to the staggered entry of food-delivery platforms across Chinese counties, we find that platform access substantially reduces recidivism, with larger effects among individuals with property-crime histories and those facing greater labor-market barriers. Variation in payment arrangements points to earnings timing as a key mechanism: reductions are substantially larger under instant pay than under monthly pay. Wage-equivalent estimates imply that replicating the gains from instant pay under monthly pay would require substantial wage increases, especially when liquidity constraints are tighter and release is more recent. We detect no statistically significant effect of ride-hailing entry, which entails higher entry barriers, while criminal background checks for delivery riders substantially erode the gains from platform access. These findings suggest that liquidity constraints limit the crime-reducing benefits of employment during reentry, making timely access to earnings central to the effectiveness of work opportunities.

主讲人介绍/Biography of the speaker：

刘冲，北京大学经济学院教授，财政学系主任，入选教育部“长江学者”特聘教授，Review of Development Economics共同主编，《经济科学》、《产业经济评论》副主编。研究领域为公共经济学和发展经济学。近年来在Review of Economics and Statistics、Economic Journal、Journal of Development Economics、《经济研究》、《管理世界》等国内外权威期刊发表论文五十余篇。主持国家自然科学基金重点专项、国家社科重大专项等课题，聚焦国家重大战略需求的咨政报告20余次获得采纳和肯定性批示。