金融科技学院Seminar: Employees’ Strategic Disclosure on Social Media:
Evidence from Glassdoor Reviews during Contract Renegotiations
时 间/Date &Time：2022年12月28日（周三）下午14:30-16:00
线上会议/Online meeting:Zoom Meeting
主题/Title：Employees’Strategic Disclosure on Social Media: Evidence from Glassdoor Reviews during Contract Renegotiations
This study provides the first evidence that employees strategically disclose workplace information on social media. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we show that firms receive lower Glassdoor employer ratings in the months leading up to the expiration of labor contracts than at other times. The decline in Glassdoor ratings is more pronounced for labor unions with greater organizational power, firms with potentially higher reputational concerns, and firms with more financial resources. These results suggest that employees use the threat of low Glassdoor ratings to enhance their bargaining positions during contract renegotiations.
Furthermore, we show that lower Glassdoor ratings during renegotiation periods are associated with better employee negotiation outcomes. The ratings continue to decline after unsuccessful renegotiations relating to employee welfare. Finally, we find that Glassdoor ratings during renegotiations are more informative of actual workplace practices, suggesting that employees get better deals by disclosing information at a strategic time rather by disclosing distorted information.
2019年，王仁诚加入新加坡管理大学。加入新大之前，他于香港科技大学获得博士学位，并之后就职于澳大利亚昆士兰大学以及墨尔本大学。王仁诚的研究兴趣广泛，特别是关于会计与金融之间的交叉课题。他的论文发表于各大学术期刊，例如，Journal of Accounting Research、Journal of Accounting and Economics、以及The Accounting Review。